DR. AMBEDKAR: THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Clause wise Discussion on the Draft
Constitution
30th
July 1949 to 16th September 1949
SECTION
SIX
Clausewise
Discussion
______________________________________________________________
Contents
Continued
Articles
for Discussion:
[f1]
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
(Bombay : General) : Mr.
President, Sir, I move:
"
That after article 112-A, the following new article be inserted :
Jurisdiction
and powers of His Majesty in Council under existing law in certain cases to be exercisable
by the Supreme Court.
'
112-B. Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the
Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with
respect to matters other than those referred to in the
foregoing provisions of this Chapter in relation to which
jurisdiction and powers were exercisable by His Majesty in
Council immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law '."
Sir,
the position is this that according to the ruling of the Privy Council there is a
distinction between civil matters and mattes relating to
Income-tax and, for instance, acquisition proceedings. It has been held that the
proceedings relating to Income tax and to acquisition of property do not lie within the
purview of what are called ' civil proceedings.' And it
might therefore be held that unless a special provision was made the powers of the Supreme
Court were confined to civil proceedings. In order to
remove that doubt this article 112-B is now proposed to be introduced so as to give the
Supreme Court full powers over all proceedings, including civil proceedings and other
proceedings which are not of a civil nature. That is the reason why this article is sought
to be introduced.
****
[f2]
Mr. President:
Dr. Ambedkar, would you like to say anything?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, with regard to the amendment of my Friend, Pandit Thakur
Das Bhargava, I do not
think that that amendment is necessary if he is really enlarging the jurisdiction of the
Court. The word " practice " is generally taken to cover matters of procedure, and
article 112-B which I have proposed does not deal with procedure but deals with
substantive matter of jurisdiction. Therefore his amendment "
or practice " is unnecessary.
With
regard to the amendment of my Friend Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena, there are two
points to which I would like to reply. The first is this, that if there is to be an appeal
to the Supreme Court in matters of sentence of death
passed by Courts-martial, then such a provision could be easily made by the Indian Army
Act giving the accused person the right to appeal, and it
has been provided, if I may draw my friend's attention to clause (1) of article 114, that the Supreme Court shall
have such further jurisdiction and power with respect to any matters in the Union List. It reads :
"
114(1) The Supreme Court shall have such further
jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament
may by law confer."
If
Parliament thinks that such a power should be vested in the Supreme Court, there is no
impediment in the way of Parliament making an appropriate provision in the Army Act conferring such a power on them. Again, I should like to draw
attention to article 112 which deals with matters of special need. Under that it would be
open to the Supreme Court to entertain an appeal against a Court-martial because therein
the words used are
"
any cause or matter made by any court or tribunal,"
and
therefore, the wording being so large, no Court or tribunal could escape from the special
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court provided under article 112. Therefore, my submission is
that his amendment is also quite unnecessary.
With
regard to the amendment of my friend Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad to omit the words "
existing law "...
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad : I have not moved that.
Mr. President: He has not moved it, he has left it
to the Drafting Committee.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
If he has left it to the Drafting Committee I am very glad.
Sir. We shall certainly pay the best attention that his point deserves.
Mr. President: Then I will put the amendments.
Prof.
Shibban Lal Saksena
: In view of
the assurances given, I would like to withdraw my amendments.
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava:
I
too am withdrawing my amendment, Sir.
The
amendments were, by leave of the Assembly, withdrawn.
(Article
112B was added to the Constitution.)
[f3] Mr. President: Then we go back to New Article
15A.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
Sir, I move :
"That
after article 15, the following article be inserted:
'
15A. (1) No person who is arrested shall be
detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such
arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2)
Every person who is arrested and
detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of
twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no
such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a
magistrate.
Protection
against certain arrests and detentions
(3)
Nothing in this article shall apply
(a) to
any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b) to
any person who is arrested under any law providing for preventive detention:
Provided
that nothing in sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this article shall permit the detention of
a person for a longer period than three months unless
(a) an
Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have been or are qualified to be appointed
as judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three
months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention, or
(b) such
person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under
clause (4) of this article.
(4)
Parliament
may by law prescribe the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in
which a person who is arrested under any law providing for preventive detention may be
detained for a period longer than three months and also the maximum period for which any
such person may be so detained '."
Sir,
the House will recall that when at a previous session of this Assembly we were discussing
article 15, there was a great deal of controversy on the issue as to whether the words
should be " except according to procedure established
by law ", or whether the words " due process "
should be there in place of the words which now find a place in article 15. It was
ultimately accepted that instead of the words " due
process ", the words should be " according to procedure established by law ". I know that a large part of the House including
myself were greatly dissatisfied with the wording of article 15. It will also be recalled
that there is no part of our Draft Constitution which has been so violently criticised by
the Public outside as article 15 because all that article 15 does is this, it only
prevents the executive from making an arrest. All that is necessary is to have a law and
the law need not be subject to any conditions or limitations. In other words, it was felt
that while this matter was being included in the Chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights,
we were giving a carte blanche to Parliament to
make and provide for the arrest of any person under any circumstances as Parliament may
think fit. We are therefore now, by introducing article 15A, making, if I may say so, compensation for what was done then in passing article 15. In
other words, we are providing for the substance of the law of "
due process " by the introduction of article 15A.
Article
15A merely lifts from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code two of the most fundamental principles which every civilised country follows
as principles of international justice. It is quite true that these two provisions
contained in clause (1) and clause (2) are already to be found
in the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore probably it might be said that we are really
not making any very fundamental change. But we are, as I contend, making a fundamental
change because what we are doing by the introduction of article 15A is to put a limitation
upon the authority both of Parliament as well as of the Provincial Legislature not to
abrogate these two provision's, because they are now
introduced in our Constitution itself.
It
is quite true that the enthusiasts for personal liberty are probably not content with the
provision's of clauses (1) and (2).
They probably want something more by way of further safeguards against the inroads of the
executive and the legislature upon the personal liberty of the citizen. I personally think
that while I sympathise with them that probably this
article might have been expanded to include some further
safeguards, I am quite satisfied that the provisions contained are sufficient against
illegal or arbitrary arrests.
As
Members will see, the provisions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of article 15A are made subject to certain limitations
which are set out in clause (3) which says that
the provisions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of article 15A will not
apply to any person who for the time being is an enemy
alien. I do not think that there could be any further
objection to the reservation made in clauses (3)(ii) in respect of an enemy alien.
With
regard to sub-clause (b)
of clause (3) I think it has to be recognised
that in the present circumstances of the country, it may be necessary for the executive to
detain a person who is tampering either with public order as mentioned in the Concurrent
List or with the Defence Services of the country. In such a case I do not think that the
exigency of the liberty of the individual should be placed above the interest of the
State. It is on that basis that sub-clause (b) has been included within the provisions of clause (3).
There
again, those who believe in the absolute personal liberty of the individual will recognise
that this power of preventive detention has been helged in
by two limitations : one is that the Government shall have
power to detain a person in custody under the provisions of clause (3) only for three months. If they want to detain
him beyond three months they must be in possession of a report made by an advisory board
which will examine the papers submitted by the executive and will probably also give an
opportunity to the accused to represent his case and come
to the conclusion that the detention is justifiable. It is
only under that that the executive will be able to detain him for more than three months.
Secondly, detention may be extended beyond three months if Parliament makes a general law
laying down in what class of cases the detention may exceed three
months and state the period of such detention.
I
think, on the whole, those who are fighting for the protection of individual freedom ought
to congratulate themselves that it has been found possible to introduce this clause which,
although it may not safisfy those who hold absolute views
in this matter, certainly saves a great deal which had been lost by the non-introduction
of the words ' due process of law '. Sir, I commend this article to the
House.
****
[f4] Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava :.. .The House has just heard
the speech of the Honorable Mover of the main motion. I
need not recall to the memory of the House the heated controversy which raged about a year
and a quarter ago round the words ' due process of law '. Now a
substantive part of the ' due process ' has practically been given up after 70 per cent,
being secured in article 13. I should think that in the circumstances of our country, this
provision of ' due process ' is certainly necessary cent per cent. It is the only right
process in this country....
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, may I say a word? I am prepared to accept one of the amendments of my Honorable
Friend which says that the accused shall have the right to be defended. I can add these
words in the last line of clause (1) of article
15A. It will run thus : '
be denied the right to consult or to be defended by lawyers of his choice.' I think that will carry out my Honorable Friends
intention.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: In trials
as well as in criminal proceedings?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar: 'Defended' means that. Could we not curtail the debate now?
****
[f5]
Shri H. V. Kamath :
...In order to obviate or at least mitigate the evils or the harm that might accrue from
unjust arrest of people by the police or other authorities I wish to provide through this
amendment specifically that the parson arrested shall be
informed of the grounds of his arrest within seven days following his arrest. The words
used in this article moved by Dr. Ambedkar are " as soon as may be ".
I would be happy if the person is informed of the grounds even at the time of his arrest.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That is the intention. You are worsening the position by your amendment.
Shri
H.
V. Kamath : Why
not then make it specific? I would welcome the substitution of the words " as soon as may be "by the word " immediately ". My
Friend Shrimati Pumima Banerjee, has also moved an amendment to the same article,
where she wishes to substitute the words " as soon as
may be " by "
not less than fifteen days ". I think fifteen days is
far too long a period. I think twenty-four hours would be the best. In any case if there
is any hitch in informing the arrestee
of the grounds of his arrest, I think in no case should it exceed more than a week.
Coming,
Sir, to the next amendment (No. 108), I beg to move:
"
That in amendment No. I of List I (Eighth Week), in clause (2) of the proposed new article I5A, after the word
' magistrate ', occuring at the end, the words '
who shall afford such person an opportunity of being heard ' be added."
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
I must tell my Honorable Friend Mr. Kamath that he is worsening the position. Our
intention is that the words " as soon as possible " really mean immediately after arrest, if not before
arrest. Clause (2) says
that every parson who is arrested and detained in custody
shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of
such arrest. No magistrate can exercise his authority in permitting longer detention
unless he knows the charges on which a man has been detained.
Shri
H. V. Kamath :
I know a little of the Criminal Procedure. I have known of cases where magistrates have
remanded persons for fifteen days at a stretch without the police filling a chalan or charge
sheet before him. I know of magistrates who have remanded parsons
without caring to go into the prima
fade merits of the case. Another thing that Dr. Ambedkar said was that the words "
as soon as may be " really means " immediately ".
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
It means in any case within twenty-four hours.
Shri
H. V. Kamath:
May I invite his attention to certain articles where the words "
as soon as may be " have been used without any
specific connotation. Take for instance article 280 which relates to the Emergency Powers
of the President.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
The interpretation of the meaning of the words " as
soon as may be " must differ with the context.
Shri
H. V. Kamath : I
do not know whether Dr. Ambedkar will be always in India to interpret and argue with
doubting layers and doubting judges as to the meaning of the words and phrases used in
this Constitution. I am sorry Dr. Ambedkar will not be immortal to guide our judges and
lawyers in this country. As the Constitution is being framed not for Dr. Ambedkar's life time, but for generations to come, I think we must be
specific in what we say.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
You are selling your immortality very cheap.
Shri
H. V. Kamath:
I have no desire for physical immortality. It appears however that Dr. Ambedkar presumes
he will be immortal.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
You might admit you have made a mistake in tabling this amendment.
****
[f6]
Shri H. V. Kamath :
.. .Dr. Ambedkar in his
speech referred to the enthusiastic champions of absolute liberty. I shall make it quite
clear that I am not an advocate of absolute
liberty.
Mr. President: He did not talk of absolute liberty
today.
Shri
H. V. Kamath :
He did. Sir, if I remember aright. (The Honorable Dr.
Ambedkar noded in the affirmative). He referred to
absolute personal liberty. I am not a champion or advocate of absolute personal liberty....
ARTICLE
15A
[f7]
Shri Mahavir Tyagi (United
Provinces : General) :
Sir, Dr. Ambedkar will please pardon me when I express my
fond wish that he and the other members of the Drafting Committee had had the experience
of detention in jails before they became members of the Drafting Committee.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
I
shall try hereafter to acquire that experience.
Shri
Mahavir Tyagi :
I may assure Dr. Ambedkar that, although the British
Government did not give him this privilege, the Constitution he is making with this own
hands will give him that privilege in his life-time. There will come a day when they will
be detained under the provisions of the very same clauses which they are making (Interruption).
****
[f8]
Smt.
G. Durgabai
: .. .Sir, I commend this article for the acceptance of the House.
Mr.
President:
I understand Dr. Ambedkar has to make certain suggestions
to meet the criticisms that have been made against this article. I would therefore give
him a chance to speak at this stage and if any further question arises we can consider it.
Babu
Ramnarayan Singh
(Bihar : General) : Does he agree to remove the article altogether?
Mr.
President:
No.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, I relly did not think that so much of the time of the
House would be taken up in the discussion of this article 15-A. As I said, I myself and a large majority of the Drafting Committee as
well as members of the public feel that in view of the
language of article 15, viz., that arrest may be
made in accordance with a procedure laid down by the law, we had not given sufficient
attention to the safety and security of individual freedom. Ever since that article was
adopted I and my friends had been trying in some way to restore the content of due
procedure in its fundamentals without using the words "
due process ". I should have thought that Members who
are interested in the liberty of the individual would be more than satisfied for being
able to have the prospect before them of the provisions contained in article 15-A and that they would have accepted this with good grace. But
I am sorry that is not the spirit which actuates those who have taken part in this debate
and put themselves in the position of not merely critics but adversaries of this article.
In fact their extreme love of liberty has gone to such a length that they even told me
that it would be much better to withdraw this article itself.
Now,
Sir, I am not prepared to accept that advice because I have not the least doubt in my mind
that that is not the way of wisdom and therefore I will stick to article 15-A. I quite
appreciate that there are certain points which have been made by the various critics which
require sympathetic consideration, and I am prepared to bestow such consideration upon the
points that have been raised and to suggest to the House certain amendments which I think
will remove the criticism which has been made that certain fundamentals have been omitted
from the draft article 15-A. In replying to the criticism I propose to separate the
general part of the article from the special part which deals with preventive detention; I
will take preventive detention separately.
Now
turning to clause (1) of article 15-A, I think
there' were three suggestions made. One is with regard to
the words " as soon as may be ". There are amendments suggested by Members that these
words should be deleted, and in place of those words "
fifteen days " and in some places " seven days " are
suggested. In my judgement, these amendments show a complete misunderstanding of what the
words " as soon as may be "
mean in the context in which they are used. These words are integrally connected with
clause (2) and they cannot, in my judgement, be read
otherwise than by reference to the provisions contained in clause (2), which definitely say
that no man arrested shall be detained in custody for more than 24 hours unless at the end
of the 24 hours the police officer who arrests and detains him obtains an authority from
the magistrate. That is how the section has to be read. Now it is obvious that if the
police officer is required to obtain a judicial authority from a magistrate for the
continued arrest of a person after 24 hours, it goes without saying that he shall have at
least to inform the magistrate of the charge under which that man has been arrested, which
means that " as soon as "
cannot extend beyond 24 hours. Therefore all those amendments
which suggest fifteen days or seven days are amendments which really curtail the liberty
of the individual. Therefore I think those amendments are entirely misplaced and are not
wanted.
The
second point raised is that while we have given in clause (1) of article 15-A a right to an accused person to
consult a legal practitioner of his choice, we have made no provision for permitting him
to conduct his defence by a legal practitioner. In other words, a distinction is made
between the right to consult and the right to be
defended. Personally I thought that the words " to
consult " included also the right to be defended because consultation would be utterly purposeless if
it was not for the purpose of defence. However, in order to remove any ambiguity or any
argument that may be raised that consultation is used in a limited sense, I am prepared to
add after the words " to consult " the words " and
be defended by a legal practitioner ", so that there
would be both the right to consult and also the right to
be defended. A question has been raised by the last speaker as to the meaning of the words
" legal practitioner of his choice ". No doubt the words "
of his choice " are important and they have been
deliberately used, because we do not want the Government of the day to foist upon an
accused person a counsel whom the Government may think fit to appear in his case because
the accused person may not have confidence in him. Therefore we have used the words " of his choice ".
But the words " of his choice " are qualified by the words "
legal practitioner". By the phrase "legal practitioner" is meant what we
usually understand, namely, a practitioner who by the rules of the High Court or of the
Court concerned, is entitled to practise.
Now,
Sir, I come to clause (2). The principal point is that raised by my Friend Mr. Pataskar. So far as I was able to understand, he wanted to
replace the word " Magistrate " by the words "
First class Magistrate ". Well, I find some
difficulty in accepting the words suggested by him for two reasons. We have in clause (2) used very important word's, namely, " the
nearest Magistrate " and I thought that was very
necessary because otherwise it would enable a police officer to keep a man in custody for
a longer period on the ground that a particular Magistrate to whome
he wanted to take the accused, or the Magistrate who would be ultimately entitled to try
the accused, was living at a distance far away and therefore he had a justifiable ground
for detaining him for the longer period. In order to take away any such argument, we had
used the words " the nearest Magistrate ". Now supposing, we were to add the words " the nearest First Class Magistrate": the position
would be very difficult. There may be " the nearest
Magistrate " who should be approached by the police
in the interests of the accused himself in order that his case may be judicially
considered. But he may not be a First Class Magistrate. Therefore, we have really to take
a choice; whether we shall give the accused the earliest opportunity to have his matter
decided and looked into by the Magistrate near-about, or
whether we should go in search of a First Class Magistrate. I think " the nearest Magistrate "
is the best provision in the interests of the liberty of the accused. I might also point
out to my Friend, Mr. Pataskar, that even if I were to
accept his amendment" the nearest First Class
Magistrate"it would be perfectly possible for the Government of the day to
amend the Criminal Procedure Code to confer the powers of a First Class Magistrate on any
Magistrate whom they want and thereby cheat the accused. I do not think therefore that his
amendment is either desirable or necessary and I cannot accept it.
Now,
those are the general provisions as contained in article \5(a),
and I am sure...[f9]
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava :
Kindly consider...
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Now, my Friend, Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava has raised the question of the right of
crossexamination.
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava :
And for reasons recorded.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Well, that I think is a salutary provision, because I think that the provision which
occurs in several provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code making it obligatory upon the
Magistrate to record his reasons in writing enables the High Court to consider whether the
discretion left in the Magistrate has been judicially exercised. I quite agree that that
is a very salutary provision, but I really want my friend to consider whether in a matter
of this kind, where what is involved is remand to custody
for a further period, the' Magistrate will not have the
authority to consider whether the charge framed against the accused by the police is prima facie borne out.
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava
: At present also under section 167(3) these words are there. It is today incumbent upon every
Magistrate to whom a person is taken to record the reasons if he allows the detention to
continue.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That is quite true. They are there. But are they very necessary ?
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava
: Absolutely necessary!
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Personally, I do not think they are necessary. Let us take the worst case. A Magistrate,
in order to please the police, so to say, got into the habit of granting constant remands,
one after the other, thereby enabling the police to keep the accused in custody. Is it the
case that there is no remedy open to the accused ? I think
the accused has the remedy to go to High Court for revision and say that the procedure of
the Court is being abused.
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava:
How can a poor person go to the High Court?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
I do not want to close my mind on it. If there is the necessity I think the Drafting
Committee may be left to consider this matter at a later stage, whether the introduction
of these words are necessary. As at present advised, we think those words are not
necessary.
Now
I come to the second part of article 15(3) dealing with
preventive detention. My Friend, Mr. Tyagi, has been quite
enraged against this part of the article. Well, I think I can forgive my Friend, Mr.
Tyagi, on that ground because after all, he is not a lawyer and he does not really know
what is happening. He suddenly wakes up, when something which is intelligible to a common
mind, crops up without realizing that what crops up and what makes him awake is really
merely consequential. But I cannot forgive the layer members of the House for the attitude
that they have taken.
What
is it that we are doing ? Let me explain to the House what
we are doing now. We had before us the three Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule. In
the three Lists there were included two entries dealing with preventive detention, one in
List I and another in List III. Supposing now, this part of
the article dealing with
preventive detention was dropped. What would be the effect of it ? The effect of it would be that the Provincial Legislatures
as well as the Central Legislature would be at complete liberty to make any kind of law
with preventive detention, because if this Constitution does not by a specific article put
a limitation upon the exercise of making any law which we have now given both to the
Center and to the Provinces, there would be no liberty left, and Parliament and the
Legislatures of the States would be at complete liberty to make any kind of law dealing
with preventive detention. Do the lawyer Members of the House want that sort of liberty to
be given to the Legislatures of the States and Parliament ?
My submission is that if their attitude was as expressed today, that we ought to have no
such provision, then what they ought to have done was to
have objected to those entries in List I and List III. We are trying to rescue the thing.
We have given power to the Legislatures ofthe State and Parliament to make laws regarding
preventive detention. What I am trying to do is to curtail that power and put a limitation
upon it. I am not doing worse. You have done worse.
Coming
to the specific provision contained in the second part, I will first...[f10]
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava : Who made those Lists ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
I made them : you passed them!
I had these limitations in mind. Now I come to the proviso to clause 3(b)
Shri
Mahavir Tyagi :
Will you help laymen to understand as to why you have not provided for the revision by the Advisory Board of the cases under clause (4) ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I
cannot explain to him the legal points in this House. This House is not a law class and I
cannot indulge in that kind of explanation now. The Honorable Member is my friend; if he
does not understand he can come and ask me afterwards.
Now
I will deal with the proviso which is subject to two sorts of criticisms. One criticism is
this : that in the case of persons who are being arrested
and detained under the ordinary law as distinct from the law dealing with preventive
detention, we have made provision in clause (1) of article 15A that the accused person shall be
informed of the grounds of his arrest. I said we do not make any such provision in the
case of a person who is detained under preventive detention. I think that is a legitimate
criticism. I am prepared to redress the position, because
I find that, even under the existing laws made by the various provincial governments
relating to preventive detention, they have made provision for the information of the
accused regarding the grounds on which he has been
detained. I personally do not see any reason why when provinces who are anxious to have
preventive detention laws have this provision, the Constitution should not embody it.
Therefore I am prepared to incorporate the following clause after clause (3) in article 15A:
"
(3a) Where an
order is made in respect of any person under sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this article, the authority making an order
shall...."
Babu
Ramnarayan Singh :
Sir, Dr. Ambedkar says that provinces want the inclusion of this clause...
Mr. President: He has not said anything of that
sort. What he has said is that several of the Acts which have been passed by the provinces
for preventive detention contain certain provisions. He wants to incorporate a similar
provision in this article.
Babu Ramnarayan Singh : I wanted to know whether we are passing
legislation at the dictates of the provinces.
Mr. President: Nothing of the sort.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
I find that Mr.Ramnarayan Singh is somewhat disaffected
with the provincial government to which he belongs.
As
I was saying, I think this provision ought to do :
After
clause (3) of article 15A the following clause
be inserted :
"
(3a) Where an order is made in respect of any person under sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this article the
authority making an order shall as soon as may be communicate to him the grounds on which
the order has been passed and afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
representation against the order.
(b)
Nothing in clause (3a) of this article, shall require the authority making any order under
sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this
article to disclose the facts which that authority
considers to be against the public interest to
disclose."
These
are the exact words in some of the Acts of the provinces and I do not see any reason why
they should not be
introduced here, so that this ground of criticism that we are detaining a person merely
because his case comes under preventive detention, without even informing him of the
ground's on which we detain him. Now that is met by the
amendment which I have proposed.
The
Honorable Shri K. Santhanam
(Madras : General): Is it
in addition to the provision in clause (1) ? There is already a provision that no person shall be
detained in custody without being informed.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
It does not deal with persons arrested for preventive detention.
The
Honorable Shri K. Santhanam
: Does it not include a person who is arrested for
preventive purposes ? I thought clause (1) includes every kind of
detention.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
No. That is not our understanding anyhow. The cases are divided into two categories.
Shri Mahavir Tyagi :
He is a lawyer.
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That is in a court of law, not here.
Mr. President: He is not a lawyer.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
I think it would be much better to say : Nothing in
clauses (1) and (2)
shall apply to clause (3). That is the
intention. So I have met that part of their criticism.
Now
I come to the question of three months' detention without enquiry or trial. Some Members
have said that it should not be more than 15 days and others have suggested some other
period and so on. I would like to tell the House why exactly we thought that three months was a tolerable period and 15 months too
long. It was represented to us that the cases of detunes may be considerable. We do not
know how the situation in this country will develop, what would be the circumstances which
would face the country when the Constitution comes into operation, whether the people and
parties in this country would behave in a constitutional manner in the matter of getting
hold of power, or whether they would resort to unconstitutional methods for carrying out their purposes. If all of us follow
purely constitutional methods to achieve our objective, I think the situation would have
been different and probably the necessity of having preventive detention might not be
there at all.
But
I think in making a law we ought to take into consideration the worst and not the best.
Therefore if we follow upon that position, namely, that there may be many parties and
people who may not be patient enough, if I may say so, to follow constitutional methods
but are impatient in reaching their objective and for that purpose resort to
unconstitutional methods, then there may be a large number of people who may have to be
detained by the executive. Supposing there is a large
number of people to be detained because of their illegal or unlawful activities and we
want to give effect to the provisions contained in sub-clause (a) of that proviso, what would be the situation ? Would it be possible for the executive to prepare the causes, say against one hundred people who may have been
detained in custody, prepare the brief, collect all the information and submit the cases
to the Advisory Board ? Is that apractical possibility ? Is it a practical possibility for the Advisory Board to
dispose of so many cases within three months, because I will say that the provisions
contained in sub-clause (a) of the proviso are
peremptory in that if they want to detain a person beyond three month's they must obtain an order from the Advisory Board to that
effect.
Therefore,
having regard to the administrative difficulties in this matter, the Drafting Committee
felt that the exigencies of the situation would be met by putting a time limit of three
months. There is no other intention on the part of the
Drafting Committee in prescribing this particular time limit and I hope having regard to
the facts to which I have referred the House will agree
that this is as good and as reasonable a provision that
could be made.
Now,
I come to the Advisory Board. Two points have been raised. One is what is the procedure of
the Advisory Board. Sub-clause (a) does not make
any specific reference to the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board. Pointed
questions have been asked whether under subclause (a) the executive
would be required to place before the Advisory Board all the papers connected with the
case which have led them to detain the man under preventive custody.
The
pointed question has been asked whether the accused person would be entitled to appear
before the Board, cross-examine the witnesses, and make his own statement. It is quite
true that this sub-clause (a) is silent as to
the procedure to be followed in an enquiry which is to be conducted by the Advisory Board.
Supposing this sub-clause (a) is not improved
and remains as it is, what would be the consequences ? As
I read it, the obtaining of the report in support of the order is an obligatory provision.
It would be illegal on the part of the executive to detain a man beyond three months
unless they have on the day on which the three months period expires in their possession a
recommendation of the Advisory Board. Therefore, if the executive Government were not to
place before the Advisory Board the papers on which they rely, they stand to lose
considerably, that is to say, they will forfeit their authority to detain a man beyond
three months.
Therefore,
in their own interest it would be desirable. I think necessary, for the executive
Government to place before the Advisory Board the documents on which they rely. If they do
not, they will be taking a very grave risk in the matter of administration of the
preventive law. That in itself, in my judgement, is enough of a protection that the
executive will place before it.
If
my friends are not satisfied with that, I have another proposal and that is that, without
making any specific provisions with regard to procedure to be followed in sub-clause (a) itself, to add at the end of subclause (4) the following words :" and Parliament may also prescribe the procedure to be
followed by an Advisory Board in an enquiry under clause (a) of the proviso to clause (3) of this article," I am prepared to give
the power to Parliament to make provision with regard to the procedure that may be
followed by the Advisory Board. I think that ought to meet the exigencies of the
situation.
Sir,
these are all the amendments I am prepared to make in response to the criticisms that have
been levelled against the different parts of the article 15A.
I
will now proceed to discuss some miscellaneous suggestions.
Shri
Jaspat Roy Kapoor
: In that case, probably sub-section (b) of the proviso
to clause (2) will go ? .
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Nothing will go.
Dr.
Bakhshi Tek Chand (East Punjab : General) : You have agreed
that the grounds of the detention will be communicated to the person affected and his
explanation taken.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
And he will also be given an opportunity to put in a written statement.
Dr. Bakhshi Tek
Chand : Will you agree also to the other point to
which I drew attention, namely, that as in the Madras Act, the explanation will be placed
before the Board ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
All papers may be placed before him. That is what I say.
Dr. Bakhshi Tek Chand :
All papers may not be placed before him. I have some experience. They will say that this
is a very small matter. If you give him an opportunity to submit an explanation within a
specified time, why do you fight shy of incorporating this provision ? In sub-clause (2) of sub-section (1)
of section 3 of the Madras Act there is provision that the explanation will be placed
before the Board.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That, I consider, is implicit in what I said.
Dr. Bakhshi Tek Chand :
Why not make it clear ? It is not there in the Bombay Act
or in the United Provinces Act.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
As I stated, in the requirement regarding the submission of papers to the Advisory Board
under sub-clause (a) is implicit the submission
of a statment by the accused. If that is not so, I am now
making a further provision that Parliament may by law prescribe the procedure, in which
case Parliament may categorically say that these papers shall be submitted to the Advisory
Board. Now I am not prepared to make any further concession at all.
Shri
Mahavir Tyagi :
Dr. Ambedkar will please give me one minute ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Not now.
Shri
Mahavir Tyagi:
I want to know whether the detenus under clause (4), according to the law made by Parliament or by
the provinces, will have the benefit of their case being reviewed by the tribunal ?
Sir,
I want to know whether the detenus who will be detained under the Act which Parliament
will enact under clause (4) will have the
privilege of their case being reviewed by the tribunal proposed ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
My Friend Mr. Tyagi is acting as though he is overwhelmed by the fear that he himself is
going to be a detenu. I do not see any prospect of that.
Shri
Mahavir Tyagi : I
am trying to safeguard your position.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar: I
will now deal with certain miscellaneous suggestions made.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava : What about the safeguards regarding cross-examination and
defence ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
The right of cross-examination is already there in the Criminal Procedure Code and in the
Evidence Act. Unless a provincial Government goes absolutely stark mad and takers away these provisions it is unnecessary to make any
provision of that sort. Defending includes cross-examination.
Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargava
: They even try to usurp power to this extent.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
If you can give a single instance in India where the right
of cross-examination has been taken away, I can understand it. I have not seen any such
case.
Sir,
the question of the maximum sentence has been raised. Those who want that a maximum sentence may be fixed will please note the provisions of clause (4) where it has been definitely stated that in
making such a law. Parliament will also fix the maximum
period.
Pandit
Hirday
Nath Kunzru : The word is ' may '.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
' May ' is ' shall '.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru :
Parliament may or may not do that.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That is true, but if it does, it will fix the maximum.
Another
question raised is as regards the maintenance of the detenus and
their families.
Shri
Jaspat Roy Kapoor
: What about periodical reviews ?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
I
am coming to that. That is not a matter which we can introduce in the Constitution itself.
For instance, it may be necessary in some cases and may not be necessary in other cases. Besides, clause (4)
gives power to Parliament also to provide that maintenance shall be given.
Personally,
myself, I think the argument in favour of maintenance is
very weak. If a man is really digging into the foundations of the Stale and if he is
arrested for that, he may have the right to be fed when he is in prison; but he has very little right to ask for maintenance.
However, ex-gratin.
Parliament and the Legislature may make provision. I think such a provision is possible
under any Act that Parliament may make under clause (4).
With
regard to the review of the cases of detenus, there again,
I do not see why it should not be possible for either the provincial Governments in their
own law to make provision for periodical review or for Parliament in enacting a law under
clause (4) to provide for periodical review. I
think this is a purely administrative matter and can be regulated by law.
My
Friend Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar,
said that I really do not have much feeling for the detenus, because I was never in jail,
but I can tell him that if anybody in the last Cabinet was
responsible for the introduction of a rule regarding
review, it was myself. A very large part of the Cabinet was opposed to it. I and one other
European member of the Cabinet fought for it and got it. So, it is not necessary to go to
jail to feel for freedom and liberty.
Then
there is another point which was raised by my Friend, Mr. Kamath.
He asked me whether it was possible for the High Courts to issue writs for the benefit of
the accused, in cases of preventive detention. Obviously the position is this. A writ of habeas corpus can
be asked for and issued in any case, but the other writs depend upon the circumstances of
each different man, because the object of the writ of haheas corpus is a very limited one. It is limited to finding out by the Court whether the man has been arrested under law, or whether he has been arrested merely by executive
whim. Once the High Court is satisfied that the man is arrested under some law, habeas corpus must come to an end. If he has not been arrested,
under any law, obviously the party affected may ask for any other writ which may be
necessary and appropriate for redressing the wrong. That is my reply to Mr. Kamath.
Sir,
I hope that with the amendments I have suggested the House will be in a position to accept
the article 15 A.
Mr. President: I will now put the amendments to
the vote.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
They might all be withdrawn.
Mr.
Naziruddin Ahmad
(West Bengal : Muslim) :
New clauses have just been added. Will they be put to the vote now ?
Mr. President: Yes, just now ?
****
[f12] Mr. President: The question is :
"
That in amendment No. I above, in clause (1)
of the proposed new article 15A, for the words ' a legal
practitioner of his choice ' the words ' and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice in
all criminal proceedings and trials ' be substituted."
(The
amendment was negatived.)
Shri
T. T. Krishnamachari
: Dr. Ambedkar has accepted a portion of this amendment.
It need not be voted upon. If it is rejected, then Dr. Ambedkar will not be able to accept a portion of
it.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Mine are independent amendments.
[f13]
Mr. President:
...I think these are all the amendments which we moved yesterday.
Dr. Ambedkar
has moved certain amendments today and I would put them to vote now.
[Six
amendments were rejected.]
[Following amendments
were adopted.]
"
That in clause (1) of article I5A, after the
word ' consult ' the words '
and be defended by ' be inserted."
"That
in clause (3) of article I5A. for the words "Nothing in this article '
the words, brackets and figures ' Nothing in clauses (1)
and (2) of the article ' be substituted."
"
That after clause (3) of article I5A, the
following clauses be inserted
'
(3a) Where an order is made in respect of any
person under sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this article the authority making an order
shall as soon as may be communicated to him the grounds on which the order has been made
and afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(3b)
Nothing in clause (3a)
of this article shall require the authority making any order under sub-clause (b) of clause (3)
of this article to disclose the facts which such authority considers to be against the
public interest to disclose.' "
"
That at the end of clause 94) of article I5A,
the following be added :
'
and Parliament may also prescribed by law the procedure to be followed by an Advisory
Board in an enquiry under clause (a) of the
proviso to clause (3) of this article.' "
Article
15 A, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President: I am
sorry I forgot to put Dr. Bakhshi
Tek
Chand's
amendment to vote. Of course it was not necessary. It is covered by Dr. Ambedkar's
amendments.
[f14]
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, I move: " That after article 209, between
Chapters VII and IX of Part VI the following be inserted:
" CHAPTER VIII
SUBORDINATE
COURTS
Appointment
of District Judges
209A. (1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and
promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.
(2)
A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to
be appointed as district judge if he has been for not less than seven years as advocate or
a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.
Recruitment
of other than district Judges to the Judicial service
209B. Appointments of persons
other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the
Governor in accordance with rules made by him in this behalf after consultation with the
State Public Service Commission and with the High Court.
Control over subordinate courts
209C. The control over
district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and
the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding
any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court but
nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person, the right
of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as
authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the
conditions of his service prescribed under such law.
209D.
(1) In this chapter (Interpretation)
(a)
the
expression " district judge " includes judge of a city civil court, additional
district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause
court chief presidency
magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions
judge and assistant sessions judge;
(b) the
expression "judicial service" means a service consisting exclusively of persons
intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts interior to the
post of district judge.
Application
of the provisions of this Chapter to certain classes of Magistrates
209F. The Governor may by public notification direct that the
foregoing provisions of this Chapter and any rules made there under shall with effect from
such date as may be fixed by him in this behalf apply in relation to any class or classes of magistrates in the State as
they apply in relation to persons appointed to the judicial service of the State subject
to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the notification.' "
Sir,
the object of these provisions is two-fold; first of all, to make provision for the
appointment of district judges and subordinate judges and
their qualifications. The second object is to place the whole of the civil judiciary under
the control of the High Court. The only thing which has been excepted from the general
provisions contained in article 209A, 209B and 209C is
with regard to the magistracy, which is dealt with in article 209E. The Drafting Committee
would have been very happy if it was in a position to recommend to the House that
immediately on the commencement of the Constitution, provision's
with regard to the appointment and control of the Civil Judiciary by the High Court were
also made applicable to the magistracy. But it has been realised, and it must be realised
that the magistracy is intimately connected with the general system of administration. We
hope that the proposals which are now being entertained by some of the provinces to
separate the judiciary from the Execution will be accepted by the other provinces so that
the provisions of article 209E would be made applicable to the magistrates in the same way
as we propose to make them applicable to the civil judiciary. But some time must be permitted to elapse for the effectuation of
the proposals for the separation of the judiciary and the execution. It has been felt that
the best thing is to leave this matter to the Governor to do by public notification as
soon as the appropriate changes for the separation of the judiciary and the executive are
carried through in any of the province. This is all I think I need say. There is nothing
revolutionary in this. Even in the Act of 1935, appointment and control of the civil
judiciary was vested in the High Court. We are marely continuing
the same in the present draft.
****
[f15] Shri R. K. Sidhva (C. P. & Berar: General): Sir, could you kindly call me again ? I had been out on some
office business when my name was called; but I have to move an amendment which is
important.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Absence cannot be an execuse.
Mr. President:
I am afraid it is too late now.
****
[f16]
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
With regard to the observations of the last speaker, I should like to say that this
chapter will be part of the Provincial Constitution, and we will try to weave this
language into that part relating to States in Part III by special adaptation at a later
stage.
There
are two amendmentsone by Mr. Chaliha and the other by Pandit Kunzruwhich
call for some explanation.
With
regard to the amendment moved by Mr. Chaliha, I am sorry to say I cannot accept it, for
two reasons: one is that
we do not want to introduce any kind of provincialism by law as he wishes to do by his
amendment. Secondly, the adoption of his amendment might create difficulties for the
province itself because it may not be possible to find a pleader who might technically
have the qualifications but in substance may not be fitted to be appointed to the High
Court, and I think it is much better to leave the ground perfectly open to the authority
to make such appointment provided the incumbent has the qualification. I therefore cannot
accept that amendment.
The
amendment of my Friend, Pandit Kunzru, raises in my judgement a very small point and that
point is this: whether the posting and promotion of the
District Judges should be with the Governor, that is to say, the government of the day, or should be transferred to 209C to the High Court? Now
the provision as contained in the Government of India Act, 1935 was this that the appointment, posting and promotion of the District Judge was entirely
in the hands of the Governor. The High Court had no place in the appointment, posting and
promotion of the District Judge. My Friend Mr. Kunzru, will see that we have considerably
modified that provision of the Government of India Act, because we have added the
condition namely, that in the matter of posting, appointment
and promotion of the District Judges, the High Courts shall be consulted. Therefore the
only point of difference is this: whether the High Court
should have exclusive jurisdiction which we propose to give in the matter of posting,
promotion and leave etc. of the Subordinate Judicial
Service other than the District Judge, or, whether the High Court should have jurisdiction
in these matters over all subordinate Judges including the District Judge. It seems to me
that the compromise we have made is eminently suitable. The
only difference ultimately will be that in the case of
Subordinate Judges any notification with regard to posting, promotion and grant of leave will issue from the High Court, while in
the case of the District Judge any such notification will be issued from the Secretariat.
Fundamentally and substantially, there is no difference at all. The District Judge will
have the protection of the High Court because the consultation is made obligatory and I
think that ought to satisfy the exigencies of the situation.
****
[f17]
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
I have nothing to say. Sir. Sardar
Hukam Singh : Sir, I have no amendment to move. I have one objection to
clause (2) of this article, to which I want to
draw the attention of the President of the Drafting Committee. The phraseology looks to me
as derogatory to the sovereignty of the Parliament and I
would request him, if possible to change the words :
.. I
only want to bring this to the notice of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee.
Mr.
President:
Sardar Hukam Singh has made certain suggestions with regard to paragraph 2. He says that
it is derogatory to the authority of Parliament to say that the President will repeal or
amend any law made by Parliament and that the words should be so modified as to indicate
that the power of Parliament is not in any way subordinated.
The Honorable Dr. B.
R. Ambedkar:
That is so. It is a kind of adaptation. In regard to the autonomous districts of Assam the
Governor of Assam has similar power to adapt the laws made by Parliament when he thinks
fit so to do. The whole law made by Parliament cannot be applied to certain peculiarly
constituted territories unless they are adapted.
Sardar
Hukam Singh
: Is that a sufficient answer.
Sir ? My suggestion was that it is derogatory to the
sovereignty of Parliament to say that the President would repeal an Act passed by
Parliament
Mr. President:
The suggestion is about a word and not about the power ?
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
The President is part of Parliament. There is no difficulty at all.
Mr.
President:
I will now put the amendment of Shri Brajeshwar Prasad to vote.
[Amendment
was negatived. Article 215 was added to the constitution.]
ARTICLE
303
[f18]
Mr.
President:
Article 303. We can now take up the definition article 303.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, I move :
"
That sub-clause (c)
of clause (1) of article 303 be
omitted."
****
The
motion was adopted.
[f19]
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
As regards (b),
I would just like to make one point. We are proposing to drop from the Constitution two
Parts which we had originally proposed in which certain communities had been enumerated as
Scheduled Castes and certain communities as Scheduled Tribes. We thought that was
cumbering the Constitution too much and that this could be left to be done by the
President by order. That is our present proposal. It seems to me that, in that event, it
will be necessary to transfer the definition clauses of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes to some other part of the Constitution and make provision for them in a
specific article itself, saying that the President shall define who are the Scheduled
Castes and who are the Scheduled Tribes. Now it seems to me that the question has been
raised with regard to article 296 and 299 which have been held over. It may be that the
definition of ' Anglo-indian
' and ' Indian Christian ' which is referred to in (b) and (c) may have to be reconsidered along with that
proposition. I request you to hold them over for the present.
Shri
V. I. Muniswami Pillai (Madras
: General) : The whole
thing regarding the Scheduled Castes, etc. may be held over.
Mr. President: I
take it that the House agrees to hold over the consideration of items (b) and (c).
[Sub-clauses
(b) and (c) were held over.]
Mr.
President:
There are no amendments to item (d).
The
question is:
"
That sub-clause (d) be adopted."
The
motion was adopted.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir,
I move :
"
That sub-clause (e)
of clause (1) of article 303 be deleted."
Mr. President: There is no Chief Judge now. There used to be subordinate High
Courts which were called Chief Courts and they used to have Chief Judges.
****
The
amendment was adopted.
Sub-clause
(e) of clause (1) was deleted
from article 303.
(Amendment
No. 3219 was not moved.)
Mr.
President:
Then (f).
There is no amendment to this.
The
question is:
"
That sub-clause (f) of clause (1) stand part of article 303."
The
motion was adopted.
The
Honorable Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
Sir, I move :
"
That for sub-clauses (g)
of clause (7) of
article 303 the following sub-clause be substituted, namely:
'
(g) ' corresponding Province ', ' corresponding Indian State '
or ' corresponding State ' means in cases of doubt such
Province, Indian State or State as may be determined by
the President to be the corresponding Province, the corresponding Indian State or the
corresponding State, as the case may be, for the
particular purpose in question;' "
We
have only included Indian States.
Shri
H. V. Kamath: Are we still going to retain the distinction
between ' State ' and ' Indian State '?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
The distinction in this :
A State now means a constituent part of the Union. An
Indian State means a State which is outside the Union hut
under the paramountey or control of the Union.
Shri R. K. Sidhva :
Is the Cutch State which is now administered by the Center
an ' Indian State '? So also Bhopal?
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
An Indian State is defined at a later stage.
Mr.
President:
There is a definition of an Indian State given later on in amendment No. 140.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : There seems to he
some confusion in the minds of Members. The terms " corresponding province "
and " corresponding Indian State " these are terms pertaining to the period before the
commencement of the Constitution. The term " corresponding Slate "
comes into existence after the commencement of the Constitution.
The difference between the two is only this. I hope there will now be no confusion on this
matter.
[Amendment of Dr. Ambedkar was
adopted. Sub-clause (g), of clause (1), as
amended was added to article 303.]
Mr.
President:
Then (h).
There is no amendment to this.
[Sub-clause (h) of clause (1) was
added to article 303.]
[f20]
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, I move :
"
That in sub-clause (i)
of clause (1) of article 303, the words ' but
does not include any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council made
under any such Act ' be omitted."
Such
Acts as the Merchant Shipping Act might have to be retained
until Parliament otherwise provides.
Shri H. V. Kamath :
With regard to this (i), there is evidently a
slight lacuna. It speaks of laws and bye-laws. But only ' rule ' is mentioned. Why not '
bye-rule ' as well ?
The
Honorable Shri K. Santhanam :
I
have got an amendment to this...
The
Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Whether a law is in force or not would depend upon various
considerations. First of all, the merger itself may have provided that certain laws shall
not be in operation. It may be that the Bombay Government after that territory has been
merged, may retain the laws for that particular territory known as Baroda, or its own legislation might abrogate it. Therefore
any existing law means the law that is in force at the
date of commencement of the Constitution.
The
Honorable Shri K. Santhanam: I
do not press my amendment.
[Above
amendment of Dr. Ambedkar was adopted. Sub-clause (i) of clause (1), as amended, was added to article 303.]
Mr.
President:
Then (j).
There is no amendment to this. The question ist:
"
That sub-clause (/') of
clause (1). stand part of article 303."
(The
motion was adopted)
Honorable
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, I move :
"
That after sub-clause (j)
of clause (1) of article 303, the following sub-clause be inserted:
'
(jj) ' foreign State ' means any
State other than India but does not include a State notified in this behalf by the
President.' "
The Honorable Shri K. Santhanam :
Would Dr. Ambedkar kindly explain what is meant by the
latter portion of this sub-clause (jj)? Will he give an illustration of that '?
****
[f21]
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
Sir, the position is this : If one were to stop with the
word " India ",
it means what a Foreign State ordinarily means. Every State is foreign to another State.
That is quite clear from the first part of the definition. Therefore, there can be no quarrel with that part of
the definition. In fact that definition may not be necessary even, but in view of the fact
that we have used the words " Foreign State " in some part of our Constitution and in view of the fact that it may be necessary for certain purposes to
declare that a Foreign State, although it is a Foreign State in the terminological sense of the word, is not a Foreign State for
certain purposes, it is necessary to have this definition and to give the power to the
President to declare that for certain purposes a State of
that kind will not be a Foreign State. The case of Malaya, I understand, is very much in
point. Therefore, it really means that for certain purposes the President may declare that
although a State is a Foreign State in the sense that it
is outside India, for certain purposes will not be treated
as a Foreign State. It is for that purpose that this definition is sought to be
introduced.
The Honorable Shri K. Santhanam: This sub-clause does not authorize the President to
notify for certain purposes. It gives a definition.
The Honorable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar:
That will, of course be remembered duly by the President when he issues the notification.
[The
amendment of Dr. Ambedkar as shown above was adopted.]
[f1]Ibid.,
15th September 1949, p. 1493
[f2]CAD,
Vol. IX, 15th September 1949, pp. 1495-1496.
[f3]CAD,
Vol. IX, 15th September 1949, pp. 1496-1498.
[f4]CAD,
Vol. IX, 15th September 1949, pp. 1500-1501.
[f5]CAD,
Vol. IX, 15th September 1949, pp. 1515-16.
[f6]CAD,
Vol. IX, 15th September 1949, p. 1518.
[f7]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, p. 1547.
[f8]lbid.,
p. 1556-1565.
[f9]Dots
indicate, interruption as shown in original.
[f10]Dots
indicate interruption.
[f11]Dots
indicate interruption.
[f12]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, p. 1566.
[f13]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, p. 1570.
[f15]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, p. 1575.
[f17]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, pp. 1581.-1582
[f18]Ibid.,
p 1583.
[f19]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, pp. 1583.-1584.
[f20]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16111 September 1949, p. 1585-1586
[f21]CAD,
Vol. IX, 16th September 1949, p. 1586.